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Abstract: 
In the context of growing interest in sexual dissidence, academic and social movements are discussing 
homonationalism as the combination of tolerance towards lesbians and gays, racism and nationalism in a neoliberal 
globalised world. In this article we aim to quantitatively compare European nation states on homonationalist values 
using data collected through the European Value Study (2008-2010), through correlations and cross tabulation 
analysis.  We ask to what extent homonationalism is reflected in the values of Europeans and if there is any 
difference among European countries. The results indicate that homonationalism is not reflected in the values of 
all Europeans. Those who are more tolerant to homosexuality tend to be less racist and nationalist. However, our 
results confirm the existence of groups of people in western European countries who combine tolerance to LGB 
people, racism and nationalism and consequently must be qualified as homonationalists. 
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Europe is experiencing a new awakening of racist and nationalist movements – the islamophobic reaction to the 
arrival of the refugees seems to be the latest culminating point. In some countries, the new extreme right is 
dominating the discourse, in others they join part of the government. But something has changed in their 
appearance. Feminisms and movements of lesbians, gays, trans*, bisexuals, interex*, queers and other sexual 
dissidents (LGTBQ+) were quite successful in putting their struggles on the agenda: their demands of the last 
decades had an impact on even the far right’s treatment of sexual orientation and gender identity. We have seen an 
openly gay man next to Marine Le Pen of the French Front National, or the lesbian mother Alice Weidel as the top 
candidate of the German Alternative für Deutschland both instrumentalising their sexuality for racism and 
islamophobia. 
Jasbir K. Puar introduced the term homonationalism to academy with the publication of her book Terrorist 
Assemblages – Homonationalism in queer Times in 2007. There she outlined homonationalism as the interplay of 
normative tolerance by and through LGBT people, racism, and nationalism (Puar, 2007). In this sense 
homonationalism presupposes a shift in the relation of nation states and homosexuality, bisexuality and 
transsexuality: years ago, homosexuality, and especially queerness, were conceived as the antithesis of norm and 
state power. In a context of important cultural shifts and neoliberalism, homosexuality is normalised (or normalises 
itself) up to that point at which the state embraces queers moralizing and uniting the rearguard in times of the ‘War 
against Terror’. 
 
In this context we wondered if Jasbir K. Puar’s biopolitical concept homonationalism could be applied to people’s 
values, specifically the values of Europeans. That is to say, if homonationalism could be conceived and measured 
as the expression of tolerance to LGBTI, racism and nationalism. This definition varies from Puar’s 
conceptualitsation: whereas Puar outlines complex and exclusionary LGBTQ, affirming claims aligning with racist 
and xenophobic positions in institutions and discourses as well as on collective imaginary on LGTBQ, queer social 
movements and gay racism, we centre on a very well circumscribed, extreme and for some maybe superficial 
definition of homonationalist values. We reviewed almost one hundred articles that included the word 
homonationalism on the Web of Science. We selected on the one hand those articles deepening the theoretical 
debate and on the other hand articles dealing more empirically with Europe.  In this regard and taking into account 
previous theoretical aspects related to Puar’s work, we propose a way to measure LGTBI+ tolerance, nationalism 
and racism quantitatively. To do so, we count on the latest data available of the European Values Study (2008-
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2010), the only European survey that contains questions dealing with the three variables. Then, based on this work 
and using a correlation analysis we aim to compare homonationalism in Europe.  Therefore, in this article, we ask 
firstly, the extent to which the values of the Europeans are homonationalist and, secondly, if there are differences 
among countries. 
 
Therefore, this article aims to contribute to previous work in several aspects.  Firstly, it is one of the very few, if 
not the only attempt to work quantitatively on homonationalism. This work represents a proposal for an 
operalisation of homonationalism in variables, which are measurable quantitatively. Secondly, it considers the 
impact of homonationalism in the values of European people. Working with a standardised database that gathers a 
huge amount of European countries gives us, thirdly, the chance to trace major comparisons between European 
countries and their population’s values. Finally, homonationalism is an emerging topic, not only in academic fields, 
but also in politics, both for institutions and for social movements. In this sense, we hope that our results give 
interesting hints for future emancipatory policies.  
On the following pages we will first explain Puar’s concept, homonationalism, and basic consensus and dissensus 
on homonationalism in Europe in the academic discussion, as well as the results of previous research on 
homonationalism. Afterwards we introduce – on the ground of feminist methodology – the quantitative and 
comparative methodology and the techniques applied. Then we present our main results and conclude the article 
with some more global reflections on our findings. 
 
 
Homo… what? – Three central elements of homonationalism 
Since its appearance the concept homonationalism has been discussed enthusiastically in the academic context. 
Jasbir K. Puar (2007) sketches homonationalism as a multifaceted and relatively complex issue. Nevertheless she 
and other academics seem to agree on a strategic reduction to the triad of normative tolerance to LGBT people, 
racism and nationalism. Indeed, this strategic reduction is extremely helpful for the application of homonationalism 
in secondary quantitative data. 
But what do the three elements of normative tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism mean? And who 
are the academic authorities they are based on? Normative tolerance to LGBT people is what the (post-)feminist 
scholar Lisa Duggan (2001) christens homonormativity. The concept relies on the foucaultian postulation that 
power is not necessarily repressive and negative, but can be positive and creative (Foucault, 1996; Ruffig, 2008; 
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Larrauri & Max, 2005). Actually, Foucault shows how power in modern times starts to regulate, discipline and 
produce ways of life (Foucault, 1996; Ruffig, 2008; Larrauri & Max, 2005). Decades later Butler (1990) 
denominates queers trying to escape established gender norms and trying to dynamite the heterosexual matrix. 
Equally, ten years later Duggan (2001) observes that dissident sexualities assume, and/or have to assume, 
heternormative lifestyles. In other words: sexual dissidence becomes normative by heteronormative projection and 
self-assumption. Duggan conjugates queerness in terms of the focaultian biopower this way: it is “a politics that 
does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while 
promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatised, depolitised gay culture anchored in 
domesticity and consumption” (Duggan, 2001, p. 50). This homonormativity gets specified in the standard family 
(Crosby et al.), the universal and almost compulsory coming out narrative (Jivraj & de Jong, 2011) as the image 
of the gay business man living in the hip city centre (Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; El Tayeb, 2012). 
The second thread which weaves the fabric of homonationalism is racism. The two bibliographic landmarks are 
Foucault and his Genealogy of Racism (Foucault, 1996; Ruffig, 2008) on the one hand and postcolonial studies 
(Chakravorty Spivak, 2009; Said, 2005) on the other. Thus homonationalism is a racism which divides the 
population in two groups: whites and others, civilisation and Barbary, West and East. The first of them is 
determined to die and the other one is targeted as an object of discipline in order to improve the productiveness of 
its members. Gayness becomes associated to whiteness, whereas racial otherness is linked to homophobia and 
intolerance, or as it puts Jasbir K. Puar: “the sexual other is white and the racial other is straight” (Puar, 2007, p. 
32). By this way, some (white) gays stopped being objects of necropolitics and enter to the sphere of normativising 
biopolitics. For Puar this sexualised racism is based on geopolitics, precisely on the ‘War against Terror’ – and 
therefore mainly, but not only, islamophobic. This is why she situates the core of homonationalism in the US, Israel 
and Western Europe. 
This brings us directly to the third element, which is nationalism: for Foucault racism is the product of the modern 
nation-state and its racism; for Puar homonationalism is a sexualised racism in purpose of the nation-state. 
Particularly nationalist is the linkage between tolerant and diverse western nation-states with Marriage for all or a 
negative and passive anti-discrimination policy (instead of positive and active social policies) opposed to the 
violent and homophobic rest of the world. However, in the academic discussion some voices defend a subversive 
homonationalism: this is when all queers (or the state) use the (peripheral) nation for common goals in benefit of 




Considering the theoretical debate on homonationalism, Zanghellini (2012) is hard but honest when he denounces 
the “paranoid structuralism” detected in many applications of the term homonationalism. Indeed, poststructuralism 
could be a good starting point for a review over the constructive critique and our proposals to refine the concept 
homonationalism, permitting a quantitative analysis. 
The first handicap is the explicative power of homonationalism. Structuralist approaches always tend to embrace 
it all, trying to give a global explanation. In this sense, we agree with Zanghellini when he indicates that 
homonationalism is not as explicative and normative as it appears to be yet. Maybe neoliberalism and racism 
driven forward by the ‘War against Terror’ does not push the LGBTQ community automatically to the right. 
Therefore, he proposes a more limited use of the concept, more descriptive and analytic. 
Another limitation of structuralism is that in its circular logic it is never clear whether the direction of social 
dynamics is bottom-up or top-down. Actually, in the academic discussion centered on LGBTQ social movements 
(Sadurní Balcells & Pujol Tarrés, 2015; Kulpa, 2014a, Kulpa, 2014b), public policies (Jivraj & de Jong, 2011; 
Røthing & Svendsen, 2011; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; Kahlina, 2015) and discourse (Bracke, 2012; Kulpa, 
2014a; Fischer, 2016) the values of the general population are the elephant in the room. This is why for the purpose 
of the value study the proposals of dual theory (Flecha, Gómez & Puigvert, 2010) appear especially useful: that 
means taking into account not just structure near subjectivity, but both (idem). Studying values through aggregated 
individual data coming from a previously designed questionnaire taking into account previous studies and 
discourse fits with the idea of mediating between and considering both, structure and subjectivity. Once we know, 
what are the people’s values are, we can investigate if these values are the product or the cause of the discourse. 
The third handicap is also linked to a poststructuralist framework. Almost all the theory is laid on poststructuralist 
authors, which is at least curious when we consider the rich diversity generated by the social sciences concerning 
nationalism (Barret, 2013; Del Barrio, Hoyos, Padilla & Lara, 2013; Caminal, 2008; Esteban-Guitart, 2013; 
García, 1994; Heitmeyer, 2002). That means that in traditional social science there are at least two main 
articulations of nationalism: the first one is linked to origins, culture and race, and the second one, which is based 
on deliberated consensus and can be traced up to Habermas’ constitutional patriotism (Caminal, 2008; Habermas, 
1990). 
To put it in a nutshell, we can say that homonationalism emerges in times of neoliberalism and ‘War against Terror’ 
and is constituted by three elements: homonormativity, racism and nationalism. The poststructuralist framework 
of the concepts has been criticised because of its excessive explicative claim. Due to this criticism, we include 
some approaches from modern social science in the analysis: this is, firstly, the idea of dual theory that social 
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processes have to consider both, bottom-up and top-down-dynamics and secondly, that there has been research on 
nationalism beyond Foucault. 
 
The State of the art on homonationalism 
We reviewed previous research on homonationalism and we observed a clear focus on the USA, Canada and Israel 
as countries, mentioned directly in thirteen, eleven and seven articles respectively. In fourth place is the UK 
mentioned six times. Seen like this, Europe does not seem to be in the centre of interest when studying 
homonationalism. Once we compare the number of times countries are mentioned by region, this changes 
significally: Europe is mentioned 24 times, whereas North America is mentioned 22 times. The rest of global 
regions does not go beyond ten mentions. In this sense, we can say that Europe is in the centre of interest of the 
academic debate on homonationalism, though the articles deal mainly with very particular issues in very particular 
countries. There are just a few articles relating to Europe as a whole and not just to some of its parts. In one of 
these Robert Kulpa observes a division between Eastern and Western Europe, highlighting how Eastern Europe is 
framed as permanently backward and homophoic, whereas Western Europe is constructed as tolerant and open 
minded, and with educator function (2014b): we will check of this east-west division can also be observed 
considering values. How far European institutions are involved in a homonationalist project is a question which is 
dealt with in three articles (Rexhepi, 2016; Ammaturo, 2015; Kahlina, 2015), two of them working especially on 
Eastern European countries and their relationship with the European institutions (Rexhepi, 2016; Kahlina, 2015). 
It is also in Eastern Europe, where authors detect the possibility of subversion of homonationalism in order to 
achieve greater inclusion, acceptance and social change in favor of sexual orientations and gender identity 
(Kahlina, 2015; Kulpa, 2014a; Kulpa, 2014b; Szulc, 2016).  
The analysis of previous research is methodologically diverse, but mainly qualitative. Some works are based on 
audiovisual analysis (Cherry, 2018; Szulc & Smets, 2015; Nebeling Petersen & Myong, 2015; MacCann, 2015), 
others on analysis of the press (Jungar & Peltonen, 2017; Travers & Shearman, 2017; Serykh, 2017). Some deal 
with pride parades and the LGBTQ+ and/or supporters’ communities (Kehl, 2018; Yildiz, 2017; Szulc, 2016; 
Ammaturo, 2016; Rexhepi, 2016; Sadurní Balcells & Pujol Tarrés, 2015; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; Kulpa, 
2014a; Bracke, 2012; Jirvraj & de Jong, 2011) and urban spaces (Mepschen, 2016; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015). 
The analysis of public policies is central, as they are the field of interaction of population and state. Here we can 
find articles concerning asylum (Raboin, 2017), as well as all these policies concerning a normalisation of 
LGBTQ+ for example in teacher education (Reimers, 2017), textbooks (Rothing & Svendsen, 2011) or sports 
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(Travers & Shearman, 2017; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; Bury, 2015), but also other policies in less delimited 
areas (Yildiz, 2017; Rexhepi, 2016; Mepschen, 2016; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; Kulpa, 2014b; Santos, 2013). 
There are also articles analysing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Ammaturo, 2015). 
Research mainly affirms the existence of homonationalist discourses, though it sometimes proposes 
reconsiderations and amplifications of the original concept. Reconsiderations and amplifications tend to have a 
positive reading of homonationalism, in a sense of social transformation towards inclusion and diversity (Kulpa, 
2014a; Kulpa 2014b; Kahlina, 2015). Also, the articles remind researchers that homonationalism has different 
faces depending on context (Hartal, 2015; Hartal & Sasson Levy, 2017), especially in the case of Eastern Europe, 
where they detect subversion and resignification (Kulpa, 2014a; Szulc, 2014; Szulc, 2016; Kahlina, 2015). The 
authors observe discourses drawing a picture of a tolerant centre including the old EU, but also the Scandinavian 
countries, opposed to the intolerant European periphery of the post-Communist countries of the East (Kulpa, 
2014a; Kulpa, 2014b; Szulc, 2014; Szulc, 2016; Kahlina, 2015). Seen that homonationalism is widely detected in 
discourse and in certain countries, it seems to be interesting to go beyond that and carry out research, on the one 
hand, on people’s values, and on the other in several European countries, in order to get a global overview over 
people’s values in Europe, allowing comparisons as well.  
In the review of the articles the use of qualitative methodology was striking: mainly all the articles have been based 
on discourse and/or narrative (Kehl, 2018; Raboin, 2017; Jungar & Peltonen, 2017; Serykh, 2017; Nebeling 
Petersen & Myong, 2015; Sadurní Balcells & Pujol Tarrés, 2015; Bury, 2015; Kahlina, 2015; Kulpa, 2014a; Kulpa 
2014b; Jirvraj & de Jong, 2011) or content analysis (Travers & Shearman, 2017) and ethnographies (Mepschen, 
2016; Ammaturo, 2016). Once we acknowledged the results, we will broaden the methodological tools used in 
analyzing homonationalism, promoting methodological pluralism (Domínguez Amorós & Simó Solsona, 2003) in 
this field.  
 
Methodological strategies  
The objectives of this article are mainly to measure to what extent homonationalism is reflected in the values of 
Europeans and if there are any differences among European countries. Therefore, it has been necessary to detect 
the crucial elements of homonationalism following the theoretic roots of the concept. Our main research questions 
are, firstly, to assess what extent the values of Europeans are homonationalist and, secondly, if there are differences 
among countries. Taking into account the objectives of this article and especially the theoretic discussion around 
homonationalism we developed two hypotheses stating, firstly, that homonationalism can be detected in the values 
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of Europeans and secondly, that the prevalence of homonationalist values does differ across Europe by 
country/region, being stronger in Western European countries. 
The choice and limitation of the study field is marked by feminist ideas. This implies, firsty, the recognition of not 
only our scientific but also personal interest in the relationship between normative tolerance towards and by LGBT 
people, racism and nationalism. Feminist methodology claims the potential of the diversity of points of view 
(Biglia & Vergés-Bosch, 2016; Botía Morillas, 2013; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1987; Martin Palomo & Muños 
Terrón, 2014). Our shared starting point is feminism – in universities and in the streets – and a quite European 
biography. We complement each other in terms of methodology and bring together different visions on nationalism 
(Heitmeyer, 2002; Nowak, 2013; Postone, 1979; Schwandt, 2010). This article reflects the tendency of feminisms 
to triangulate methods and epistemologies. Broader feminist concerns for equality and emancipation are, in that 
case, the basis for our claim against racism and sexual oppression. That is why we consider it necessary to link our 
results to political strategies of state policies, people and social movements. 
The revision of scientific literature as also the feminist activism in Europe sensitised us to the urgency of the social 
issue of homonationalism. At the same time, though, the revision of scientific literature showed that all findings 
concerning homonationalism are based on very specific qualitative research. Therefore, we considered a more 
global and quantitative approach: comparing homonationalist values of the populations of European nation states. 
In this sense this article can be considered as a first comparative and qualitative glimpse on homonationalism, in 
order to diversify methods working on, knowledge about and strategies against homonationalism. We refer to 
values and not to attitudes or opinions, because they seem to us the proper sociological and long-term variable, 
whereas opinions and attitudes are the proper terms of political science or psychology (Bergman, 1998). 
 
The secondary data we have chosen is one of the most common databases for European Value Research. We opted 
for the latest European Value Study, firstly, because this questionnaire gathers answers concerning tolerance to 
LGBT people, racism and nationalism measured in a quantitative way. Secondly, because this database has the 
most extensive coverage of European countries and regions12. 
 
1 Including Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Switzerland, Cyprus, 
Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot Community, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Northern Ireland, Georgia, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia, Kosovo-Metohija, Kosovo, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
2 Though we are aware of the fact, that Northern Ireland is no nation-state, we maintain the country/region 
units of the original matrix. We do so for two reasons: firstly a simple addition of UK and Northern Ireland 
would alter the sample; secondly, because we consider that it is important to alert about the fact that nation-
states can be composed by various nations. The faces of homonationalism in composed nation-states could be 
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Concerning the three variables, tolerance to LGBT people, racism and nationalism, we base our analysis on five 
questions of the EVS questionnaire (EVS, 2011). 
LGBTI tolerance is measured on a scale from one to ten through the question 68 “Please tell me for each of the 
following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card 
[…] homosexuality”. This question excludes, as does the whole questionnaire, the dimensions trans* and intersex* 
as well as sexual options/orientations beyond lesbians and gays. The use of the clearly psychiatrical category 
homosexual in order to describe the sexual other inhibits normativity, though the homonormativity is mainly given 
through the combination with racism and nationalism. 
Looking for a question to measure racism taking into account islamophobia and other kinds of cultural racism we 
opted for the questions 78 “Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views 
on this scale?  A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants (1) and a country’s cultural life is not 
undermined by immigrants (10). This approach to racism is a first try to measure a more ethnic nationalism. 
Though the question does not cover the most traditional essence of racism – related to biology and inferiority – it 
gives us an idea about the new expressions of a “new racism” related to culture (van Dijk, 2000). 
We construct the variable nationalism in its French republican sense creating an index starting from three variables 
related to the question 277 “Some people say the following things are important for being a truly [nationality]. 
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?”: respecting the political 
institutions and laws, having been born in country and having lived for a long time in the country. We hope that 
this variable distinguishes conceptually an openly racist nationalism from a patriotism of the constitution and a 
more constructionist vision of the nation. 
In order to respond to the research questions we applied two different techniques to the data: correlations and cross 
table analysis. On the one hand, correlations helped us to measure if the tolerance to LGBT people, racism and 
nationalism are aligned in the different countries. On the other hand, we calculated the number of persons who are 
tolerant to LGBT people, racist and nationalist at the same time for each country through cross tabulation. 
The alignment of tolerance to LGB people, racism and nationalism was measured through two correlations 
(Domínguez Amorós & Simó Solsona, 2003; SPSS, 2001; Visauta Vinacua, 1997): tolerance to LGB people with 
racism and tolerance to LGB people with nationalism. The correlation coefficient with the value 1 supposes a 
perfect representation of homonationalism in values: the more tolerant values to LGB people the more racist and 
nationalist values. The inexistence of a correlation or a negative correlation instead, supposes a lack of 
 
a field of future research. 
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homonationalism in values. 
In order to measure the weight of homonationalist values in the population we proposed creating a typology 
considering the extreme values of those who are tolerant to LGBT people, racist and nationalist. For this reason, 
we measured the number of people indicating 8, 9 or 10 in the three indicators of tolerance towards LGB people, 
racism and nationalism. Afterwards we were able to calculate the percentage of homonationalists over the different 
populations. 
Tolerance LGB, racism and nationalism 
In this part we are going to expose first of all the univariate results for the three core variables of homonationalism, 
as well as the correlations and the result of the newly created typology homonationalism. 
The indicator for the LGB tolerance provided by the EVS matrix is a scale from 1 to 10 measuring whether 
homosexuality is always (10) or never (1) justified. Therefore, a country with a perfectly LGB-friendly population 
should score an average of 10 on the scale. Obviously, this is not the case in any country. Comparing the univariates 
we can observe considerable variability, both within and between countries (Annex I, Table 1). Thirteen of forty-
five countries account for a standard deviation above 3, which highlights an important internal dispersion (idem). 
Comparing between countries, Iceland (8.34), Sweden (7.76), Netherlands (7.53), Denmark (7.25) and Norway 
(7.18) stand out at the top of the LGB tolerance scale (idem). All other countries are below 7 (idem). Georgia 
(1.14), Armenia (1.19) and Kosovo (1.29) occupy the last places in the indicator of LGB tolerance. The difference 
between the lowest and highest average is more than 7 points (idem). 
Retrieving the idea of a LGB-friendly discourse in Western European opposed to another Europe being 
permanently post-communist, in transition and homophobic (Kulpa, 2014b), data on people’s values is not very 
clear about it. If values lower than 3 are deemed as extremely intolerant, it becomes clear that such generalizations 
cannot be made: Czech Republic (4.85) and Hungary (3.26), and the Republic of Slovakia (4.79) remained 
excluded (Annex I, Table 1). Doing the same exercise with a similar threshold for Western Europe - eight out of 
ten – we only spoke of Iceland (idem). Lowering the standards and considering a value of five already moderately 
tolerant Greece (3.71), Northern Ireland (4.3), Portugal (3.68) or Cyprus (2.19) still would not enter this club, 
which is marked by a tolerant Scandinavian-Dutch center (idem). However, it is important to remember that no 
country in Eastern Europe exceeds the 5 point arithmetic half (idem). 
The second variable, racism, is also measured on a scale of 1 to 10. In this case, people have to evaluate if their 
country's culture is undermined by immigrants, indicating a ten in such an answer. Compared to LGB tolerance, 
the indicator of racism is much more homogeneous, both at the intra-state level and at the inter level (Annex I, 
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Table 2). That means, that the responses do not vary that much, both in the countries and between the countries. 
However, there is a variation within the countries; in seven countries the standard deviation surpasses the three. 
Regarding the differences between countries, the subtraction of the highest and the smallest index is less than four 
points: in Malta, the racism index is 7.68 and in Finland 3.95 (Annex I, Table 2). Apart from Malta, Turkey (6.59), 
Russia (6.17), Kosovo (6.55) and Great Britain (6.38) also stand out. They score values above six, meanwhile 
Germany (5.95) remains tightly under six (idem). In this case, it seems to be impossible to draw clear boundaries 
between European countries, although issues such as ethnic and national conflicts, immigration and inertia seem 
to play a role. 
The third element of the analysis is nationalism (Puar, 2007), in this case measured on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 
being the most extreme value of nationalism. A 10 indicates the opinion that in order to have the nationality it is 
important to respect laws and political institutions, to have been born in the country and to have lived there a long 
time. Compared to the variables analyzed above, the dispersion between countries is very low: it hardly exceeds 
two points (Annex I, Table 3). One extreme is occupied by Cyprus, with an average of 8.62, and the other extreme 
by the Netherlands, with about 6.58 points (idem). Within countries there is little spread: only five countries point 
to a standard deviation above two (idem). Again, it seems difficult to draw borders, since the averages are too 
similar. It seems though that there is less disagreement on nationalism than on homophobia and racism. From there, 
you have to control to which extent it comes with LGB tolerance. 
Homonationalist values: relations between LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism 
Correlating tolerance to LGB and racism, on the one hand, and tolerance to LGB and nationalism, the data reveals 
that in some cases there is an association and in others the is no real association (Annex II). The point is that almost 
every relation is negative, which means: the more tolerance there is to LGB, the less racism and less nationalism 
there is (idem). 
Considering the correlation between tolerance LGB and racism, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northern Ireland 
show the strongest association, whereas Kosovo, Albania and Byelorussia indicate smaller, but still statistically 
significant, values (Annex II, Table 1). Only Macedonia, Russia, Romania, Latvia, Georgia, Estonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Armenia do not have statistically significant relationships (idem). It is important, however, that 
the relationship between racism and LGB tolerance is negative, which implies that the greater the LGB tolerance 
the less racism there is. Northern Cyprus is the only country where a positive correlation (0.201**) is significant 
(idem). 
Taking into account the second crucial correlation of this work, measuring the relationship between LGB tolerance 
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and nationalism, it can also be indicated that in the vast majority of cases there is a strong relationship, as in the 
cases of Norway (-0.327 * *) and Slovenia (-0.308 **), although there are also less intense relationships such as 
Macedonia (-0.091 *), Russia (-0.07), Lithuania (-0.068 *), Moldova (-0.064 *) and Kosovo (-0,051 *) (Annex II, 
Table 2). Only in Armenia, Northern Cyprus and Montenegro can a non-significant relationship (idem) be 
observed. In the case of Cyprus it is the only positive relation (0.038) (idem). That said, it is important for 
emancipatory movements that the relationships are negative: the more LGB tolerance, the less nationalism. 
In both cases, the introduction of control variables does not entail any major change, but rather a strengthening or 
weakening of existing relationships. This change never exceeds, however, the second decimal place. That is why 
we will not go further in this matter. 
Linking the two correlations we observe that they have a high degree of association (0.712 **) and therefore it 
seems that the association between nationalism and LGB tolerance on the one hand and the association between 
racism and LGB tolerance on the other are deeply interconnected (Annex III, Table 6). 
The second technique was based on the analysis of the variable homonationalism, a variable that collects extremely 
tolerant values with LGB people (on a scale of 1 to 10 are values from 8 to 10), extremely racist values (on a scale 
from 1 to 10 are the values from 8 to 10) and extremely nationalist values (on a scale of 1 to 10 are the values from 
8 to 10). The variable measures how many ‘homonationalists’ are in every country. 
In appendix three, we can see that in the vast majority of countries there are homonationalist groups (Annex III, 
Table 1). In the same way, we must admit that the combination of LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism does not 
build a statistically significant group in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Kosovo and Northern Ireland (idem). In the 
rest of the cases the relationship has global and / or local statistical significance. 
Among the countries with the largest homonational populations, there is Britain (5.4%), Malta (5.2%), Austria 
(5.1%) and Sweden (4.5 percent). Germany (3.9%), Switzerland (3.6%), Belgium (3.4%), Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Norway (all three 3.3 percent), and Spain and Luxembourg (with 3.2 percent) score lower but 
still important values (idem). 
 
 
To what extent are Europeans homonationalist? 
Given the data above, we now consider our hypothesis and answer our main research questions. The first of the 
two theses has been that homonationalism can be detected in the values of Europeans. The hypothesis that 
13 
 
homonationalism is anchored in the values of Europeans has been elaborated based on Puar (2007) taking into 
account empirical works on European contexts (Røthing & Svendsen, 2011; Jivraj & de Jong, 2011; Petzen, 2012; 
El -Tayeb, 2012; Kulpa, 2014a; Kulpa, 2014b; Szulc, 2014; Hubbard & Wilkinson, 2015; Kahlina, 2015; Sadurní 
Balcells & Pujol Tarrés, 2015; Ammaturo, 2015; Szulc, 2016) and represents the heart of analysis. 
In order to confirm that homonationalism is present in the values of Europeans, LGB tolerance, racism and 
nationalism LGB tolerance should be positively correlated. 
As shown above there is a significant relationship, but it is almost always negative. Therefore, we have to refute 
the main hypothesis if it refers to Europeans as a whole: homonationalism is not expressed in the values of the 
people, at least if it is considered a representative sample of the general population. Only in Northern Cyprus the 
correlation between racism and LGB tolerance is statistically significant. It is extremely interesting why it is so in 
Northern Cyprus where tolerant values with LGB people correlate with racist values and should be further 
investigated. However, one particular and complex case must be considered on its own, a task that cannot be 
undertaken in this comparative and exploratory work. Taking into account the amount of homonationalists – those 
who are tolerant with LGB, racist and nationalist – this hypothesis must be affirmed partially; though at the level 
of the total population, homonationalism cannot be observed, we detected some countries where parts of the 
population have homonationalist values. Thus it can be concluded that what has been detected in public speeches 
and policies by Puar (2007), Røthing & Svendsen (2011), Jivraj & de Jong (2011), Petzen (2012) El-Tayeb (2012), 
Kulpa (2014a), Kulpa (2014b), Szulc (2014), Hubbard & Wilkinson (2015), Kahlina (2015), Sadurní Balcells & 
Pujol Tarrés (2015), Ammaturo (2015) and Szulc (2016) is only reflected in the values of a few people in certain 
countries of Western Europe. 
 
Moreover, there is a considerable group of people with homonationalist values in twelve countries. These countries 
are Great Britain, Malta, Austria, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain and Luxembourg, but definitely not in all the analyzed countries. 
 
Does homonationalism differ across Europe? 
The findings above take us to the next hypothesis, based on the work of Puar (2007) analysing homonationalism 
especially in the USA and Israel, but also claiming that it may exist elsewhere under different conditions. These 
different conditions are discussed, especially for Eastern Europe, where the authors detect subversion and 
resignification (Kulpa, 2014a; Szulc, 2014; Szulc, 2016; Kahlina, 2015).  That is why we considered that the 
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prevalence of homonationalist values does differ across Europe according to the country and region. This 
affirmation has two facets. On the one hand, we have observed that the relationship between tolerance LGB, racism 
and nationalism differs in all the countries analysed; though its sense is almost anywhere negative, the degree of 
the relation is quite different. Thus it can be concluded that in the West nationalist and racist values are still 
antagonistic to sexual diversity - as the traditional theory of the link between nation and sexuality implies (Puar, 
2007; Kulpa, 2014b; Szulc, 2014), while in the East this antagonism is not given in such a strong way because 
LGB tolerance is generally more residual and / or racism and nationalism have other antagonists. On the other 
hand, we have a strong dispersion concerning magnitude of the homonationalist group: in some countries it exceeds 
5 percent, in others there is a considerable statistically significant group, while there are other countries without 
any considerable homonationalist segment of the population. It is interesting that those countries where, generally 
speaking, LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism are antagonistic values, are the same countries where the 
homonationalist groups are minimally developed. The subversion and resignification which has been detected in 
some discourses (Kulpa, 2014a; Szulc, 2014; Szulc, 2016; Kahlina, 2015) is not reflected in the values of the 
Eastern European countries. 
Having said that, western European Countries can be considered as a centre of homonationalism. Literature 
identifies discourses which differentiate between LGB-friendly nations and homophobic nations in Europe. These 
discourses draw a picture of a tolerant centre including the old EU, but also the Scandinavian countries, opposed 
to the intolerant European periphery of the post-Communist countries of the East (Kulpa, 2014a; Kulpa, 2014b; 
Szulc, 2014; Szulc, 2016; Kahlina, 2015). If the centre of homonationalism is the association of LGB tolerance, 
racism and nationalism in the population as a whole, then there is no homonationalist population in Europe. If the 
centre of homonationalism is considered as the magnitude of a homonationalist segment in the population of the 
different European countries, its centre is definitely in Western Europe. In this sense, the discourse of gay friendly 
nations and homophobic nations has materialised in the values of some but is far from being generalised: it 
represents only a small group of the population.  
Conclusions 
In this article we aimed to unveil to what extent the values of Europeans expressed homonationalism. To do so we 
applied the concept homonationalism to the values of Europeans and analysed data from the European Values 
Survey. Through our analysis it emerged that LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism tend to be opposed, but that 
there are some Western European countries where small groups combine the three values and, therefore, can be 
considered homonationalists. This is an important contribution to our current knowledge on the topic since 
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homonationalism was never studied quantitatively nor in terms of the values of individuals. This means that what 
has been included in laws, public policies, activisms and news had some kind of representation in people’s values. 
However, there is very good news for emancipatory activists and academics concerned with social transformation: 
the worst face of homonationalist values – a combination of LGB tolerance, racism and nationalism – is far from 
being hegemonic. Those who combine tolerance for gays and lesbians with racism and nationalism are a very 
small group in any of the analyzed countries. In any case, this should not be understood as an all-clear: changes in 
values are slow. Therefore, we must continue to be attentive to sexualised racism. The small segment of people 
with homonationalist values exemplifies that struggles for sexual and gender dissidence are not necessarily 
emancipatory or left wing oriented anymore; this small segment of homonationalists provides evidence of the need 
for an intersectional approach and the construction of broader alliances. In this sense, we understand 
homonationalism as a warning, which should encourage us to work on emancipatory social movements for social 
transformation: gather differences, work together and weave a complex fabric of social change. In this direction 
the results greatly reassured us in the sense that struggles for sexual and gender dissidence are not necessarily 
bound by the political right, but connected on the contrary with non-racist and non-nationalist values.   
For all this, our results imply a significant contribution, as well as a new starting point to continue investigating 
issues surrounding homonationalism. With this in mind, we hope to continue generating new information and 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on LGB Tolerance 
 Country N Average Standard Deviation 
Albania 1414 2,11 2,073 
Austria 1430 5,42 3,335 
Armenia 1479 1,19 0,85 
Belgium 1490 5,83 3,01 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1482 1,73 1,721 
Bulgaria 1313 2,78 2,486 
Belarus 1421 2,74 2,369 
Croatia 1492 2,49 2,614 
Cyprus 951 2,19 2,079 
Northern Cyprus 482 2,23 2,243 
Czech Republic 1694 4,85 3,356 
Denmark 1478 7,25 3,178 
Estonia 1453 2,3 2,158 
Finland 1058 6,67 3,441 
France 1465 5,65 3,198 
Georgia 1451 1,14 0,708 
Germany 1999 5,69 3,124 
Greece 1461 3,71 2,948 
Hungary 1471 3,26 2,906 
Iceland 785 8,34 2,668 
Ireland 930 5,2 3,335 
Latvia 1415 2,41 2,223 
Lithuania 1356 1,95 1,924 
Luxembourg 1537 6,51 3,518 
Malta 1298 3,87 3,15 
Republic of Moldava 1446 1,72 1,702 
Montenegro 1458 1,73 1,967 
Netherlands 1521 7,53 2,912 
Norway 1071 7,18 3,221 
Poland 1433 2,86 2,55 
Portugal 1391 3,68 2,797 
Romania 1413 2,1 2,021 
Russian Federation 1391 2,23 2,238 
Serbia 1475 1,82 1,9 
Slovakia 1317 4,79 3,178 
Slovenia 1325 3,91 3,43 
Spain 1415 6,01 3,237 
Sweden 1047 7,76 3,203 
Switzerland 1223 6,35 3,321 
Turkey 2300 1,48 1,415 
Ukraine 1343 1,61 1,594 
Macedonia 1424 2,05 2,204 
Great Britain 1511 5,4 3,349 
Northern Ireland 469 4,3 2,852 










Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Nationalism 
 Country N Average Standard Deviation 
Albania 1489 7,1061 1,91718 
Austria 1476 7,7378 1,8207 
Armenia 1479 7,4422 1,82429 
Belgium 1504 6,8052 1,77622 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1468 6,7146 2,38197 
Bulgaria 1444 7,9861 1,75288 
Belarus 1457 7,1675 1,6098 
Croatia 1486 7,0505 1,9163 
Cyprus 981 8,6198 1,64105 
Northern Cyprus 476 7,1197 1,76765 
Czech Republic 1771 7,472 1,821 
Denmark 1468 6,8195 1,71269 
Estonia 1490 7,2544 1,89137 
Finland 1093 7,6496 1,62647 
France 1491 6,9095 1,84551 
Georgia 1441 8,1589 1,69325 
Germany 1962 7,29 1,79892 
Greece 1473 7,7502 1,70678 
Hungary 1501 7,2958 1,89678 
Iceland 798 6,8434 1,58071 
Ireland 968 7,8905 1,80382 
Italy 1468 7,9353 1,55535 
Latvia 1438 7,3046 1,72553 
Lithuania 1387 7,0036 1,66818 
Luxembourg 1581 6,9715 1,71732 
Malta 1486 8,5888 1,57501 
Republic of Moldava 1499 7,3936 1,71068 
Montenegro 1405 6,9046 2,30897 
Netherlands 1534 6,5847 1,58608 
Norway 1082 7,0333 1,51612 
Poland 1466 7,6357 1,66093 
Portugal 1523 7,6967 1,83946 
Romania 1430 8,0517 1,76193 
Russian Federation 1442 7,7712 1,80301 
Serbia 1448 6,7327 2,14627 
Slovakia 1467 7,4622 1,90688 
Slovenia 1347 7,7476 1,8289 
Spain 1440 7,5347 1,85062 
Sweden 1100 7,2436 1,71455 
Switzerland 1197 7,2523 1,61458 
Turkey 2230 8,1117 2,15663 
Ukraine 1452 7,4442 1,96743 
Macedonia 1462 8,5834 1,5674 
Great Britain 1512 7,6938 1,84818 
Nothern Ireland 481 7,343 1,93563 
Kosovo 1504 7,7547 2,01433 





Table 1: Correlation coefficient on LGB tolerance and racism  
Country Coefficient Autochthonous Men City 
Right 
Wing 
Under 65  
Albania -0.067* -0.063* -0.066* -0.08** -0.078* -0.063* -0.091** 
Austria -0.270** -0.278** -0.274** -0.27** -0.271** -0.25** -0.263** 
Armenia -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 -0.017 -0.039 -0.021 -0.035 
Belgium -0.183 -0.198* -0.191**  -0.205** -0.161** (-0.209**) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.033 -0.0331 -0.034 -0.046 -0.021 -0.031 -0.023 
Bulgaria -0.136** 0.136** -0.134** -0.146** -0.166** -0.135** -0.165** 
Belarus -0.070** -0.067* -0.068* -0.07* -0.099** -0.07* -0.095** 
Croatia 0.185** -0.183** -0.18** -0.177** -0.218** 0.18** -0.191** 
Cyprus -0.135** -0.12** -0.137**  -0.17** -0.107** (-0.111**) 
Northern Cyprus 0.201** 0.181** 0.198**  0.168** 0.197** (0.151**) 
Czech Republic -0.167** -0.169** -0.167** -0.174** -0.157** -0.152** -0.147** 
Denmark -0.289** -0.293** -0.284** -0.29 -0.278** -0.266** -0.26** 
Estonia -0.051 -0.065* -0.051  -0.045 -0.037 (-0.43) 
Finland -0.377** -0.379** -0.368** -0.382** -0.39** -0.378** -0.366** 
France -0.291** -0.3** -0.293** -0.286** 0.284** -0.27** -0.271** 
Georgia -0.01 -0.01 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 
Germany -0.295** -0.305** -0.291** -0.295** -0.268** -0.288** -0.269** 
Greece -0.214** -0.214** -0.215** -0.214 -0.219** -0.186** -0.206** 
Hungary -0.247** -0.247** -0.248** -0.247 -0.245** -0.244** -0.245** 
Iceland -0.293** 0.291** -0.285**  -0.289** -0.269** (-0.283**) 
Ireland -0.302** -0.302** -0.305**  -0.294** -0.304** (-0.306**) 
Italy        
Latvia -0.03 -0.036 -0.028 -0.027 -0.068* -0.034 -0.078* 
Lithuania -0.094** -0.094** -0.091** -0.092** -0.074* -0.092 -0.073* 
Luxembourg -0.069** -0.085** -0.065*  -0.078** -0.074** (-0.097**) 
Malta -0.096** -0.09** -0.096* -0.118** -0.049 -0.1** -0.1* 
Republic of 
Moldava -0.093** -0.092** -0.095** -0.081** -0.087* 
-0.089** -0.07* 
Montenegro -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 -0.239** -0.054 -0.013 (-0.051) 
Netherlands -0.237** -0.239** -0.237** -0.239** -0.18** -0.229** -0.218** 
Norway -0.312** -0.321** -0.29** -0.301** -0.303 -0.298** -0.265** 
Poland -0.104** -0.105** -0.106** -0.106** -0.116** -0.091* 0.106** 
Portugal -0.212** -0.205** -0.211 -0.21** -0.244** -0.195** 0.223** 
Romania -0.044  0.041 0.043 0.017 0.044  
Russian Federation -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.035 -0.026 -0.03 -0.034 
Serbia -0.074** -0.074** -0.077** -0.07* -0.064 -0.075** -0.062 
Slovakia -0.166** -0.164** -0.166**  0.162** -0.153 (-0.148**) 
Slovenia -0.219** -0.225** -0.21** -0.219** 0.225** -0.218** -0.222** 
Spain -0.201** -0.23** -0.205** -0.203 -0.162** -0.18** -0.208** 
Switzerland -0.135** -0.169** -0.138**  0.114** -0.131** (-0.144**) 
Turkey 0.153** -0.148** -0.152** -0.13** -0.16** -0.153** -0.135** 
Ukraine -0.094** -0.094** -0.095** -0.1** -0.086* -0.087** -0.09* 
Macedonia 0.042 -0.041 0.043 0.014 0.034 0.05 0.016 
Great Britain -0.212** -0.233** 0.215** -0.242** -0.228** -0.204** -0.263** 
Northern Ireland 0.200** -0.199** -0.217** -0.203** -0.197** -0.213** -0.217** 
Kosovo 0.054* -0.046 -0.055* -0.057* -0.087* -0.052* -0.089* 




Table 2: Correlation Coefficient on LGB tolerance and nationalism 






Albania -0.155** -0.152** -0.155** -202** -0,157** -0.151** -0.228** 
Austria -0.287** -0.302** 0.293** -0,288 -0,28** -0.254** -0.266** 
Armenia -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0,008 -0,023 -0.01 -0.024 
Belgium -0.177** -0.198 -0.178**   -0.141** (-0.157**) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.062* -0.061* -0.064* -0,069* -0,068* -0.053* -0.067* 
Bulgaria -0.241** 0.241** -0.239** -0,207** -0,217** -0.22** -0.161** 
Belarus -0.118** -0.115** -0.119** -0,118** -0,142** -0.106** -0.119** 
Croatia -0.204** -0.2** -0.202** -0,201 -0,228** -0.192** -0.208** 
Cyprus -0.228** -0.216** -0.228**  -0,237** -0.202** (-0.190**) 
Northern Cyprus 0.038 -0.002 0.038  -0,095 0.046 (-0.129**) 
Czech Republic -0.122** -0.125** 0.124** -0,119** -0,073* -0.107** -0.057* 
Denmark -0.254** -0.262** -0.247** -0,24** -0,246** -0.226** -0.208 
Estonia -0.045 -0.068 -0.048  -0,033 -0.017 (-0.038) 
Finland -0.287** -0.288** -0.309** -0,291** -0,279** -0.288** -0.299** 
France -0.282** -0.295** -0.285 -0,278** -0,269** -0.241** -0.254** 
Georgia -0.093* -0.093* -0.093** -0,092* -0,139** -0.092* -0.138** 
Germany -0.253** -0.273** -0.255** -0,249** -0,224 -0.244** -0.236** 
Greece -0.129 -0.128** -0.13** -0,134** -0,145** -0.076** -0.101** 
Hungary -0.229** -0.228** -0.222** -0,226** -0,24** -0.21** -0.221** 
Iceland -0.222** -0.216** -0.227**  -0,22** -0.185** (-0.187**) 
Ireland -0.251** -0.009 -0.246**  -0,259** -0.215** (-0.240**) 
Italy - - -     
Latvia -0.154** 0.168** -0.155** -0,149** -0,143** -0.215** -0.128** 
Lithuania -0.068* -0.075** -0.068* -0,067** -0,099* -0.046 -0.076* 
Luxembourg -0.093** -0.12** -0.088*  -0,096* -0.084* (-0.077*) 
Malta -0.117** -0.101** -0.117** -0,203** -0,153** -0.103** -0.203** 
Republic of Moldava -0.064* -0.06* -0.066* -0,044 -0,133** -0.059* -0.094** 
Montenegro 0.005 0.003 0.005  -0,033 0.012 (-0.031) 
Netherlands -0.209** -0.215** -0.206** -0,211** -0,17** -0.182** -0.149** 
Norway -0.327** -0.337** -0.325** -0,325** -0,328** -0.301** -0.311** 
Poland -0.215** -0.215** -0.216** -0,192** -0,234** -0.196** -0.192** 
Portugal -0.161** 0.156** -0.162** 0,159** -0,159** -0.134** -0.139** 
Romania -0.145** -0.144** 0.145** -0,159** -0,143** -0.141**  
Russian Federation -0.07* -0.072* -0.073* -0,072* -0,086** -0.057* -0.081* 
Serbia -0.108** -0.109** -0.107** -0,121** -0,093** -0.108** -0.091** 
Slovakia -0.124** -0.122** 0.124**  -0,14** -0.121** (-0.142**) 
Slovenia -0.308** -0.318** -0.322* -0,31** -0,317** -0.292** -0.326** 
Spain -0.166** -0.169** 0.172** -0,166** -0,143** -0.102** -0.136** 
Switzerland -0.182** 0.218** -184**  -0,169** -0.151** (-0.176**) 
Turkey -0.14** -0.14** -0.137** -0,115** -0,133** -0.137** -0.106** 
Ukraine -0.164** -0.162** -0.167** -0,164** -0,134** -0.16** -0.147** 
Macedonia -0.091* -0.092* -0.092** -0,09* -0,074* -0.088** -0.069 
Great Britain -0.192** 0.225** -0.189** -0,216** -0,234** -0.133** -0.186** 
Northern Ireland -0.171** -0.167** -0.172**  -0,213** -0.175** -0.242** 
Kosovo -0.058* 0.057* -0.057* -0,022 -0,082* -0.057* -0.081 






Table 1: % of persons with homonationalist values in Europe 
Country Percentage Autochthones Men City 
Right 
Wing Under 65 
Albania 0,2 0,2 0,1  0,4 0,2 
Austria 5,1 (**/sig) 5,4 3,5 3,3 6,1 5,8 
Armenia 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2  0,2 
Belgium 3,4 (**) 3,6 3,3  4,3 3,7 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 0,3 0,3 0,4  0,2 0,3 
Bulgaria 0,2 (**) 0,2 0  0,3 0,2 
Belarus 0,1 0,2 0   0,2 
Croatia 0,2 (**) 0,1 0,2 0,4  0,2 
Cyprus 0,8 0,8 0,5  1,1 1,1 
Northern Cyprus 1,6 (**) 2,6 1,1   1,7 
Czech Republic 1,3 (*/sig) 1,4 1,6 3,5 1,8 1,4 
Denmark 3,3 (**) 3,5 2,1 2,9 3,7 3,2 
Estonia 0,5 0,5 0,2  0,2 0,6 
Finland 2,3 (**) 2,3 0,5 2,3 1,1 2,5 
France 2,5 (**/sig) 2,7 1,9 1,6 2,2 2,9 
Georgia       
Germany 3,9 (**) 4,1 3,3 6,9 4,3 4,5 
Greece 1,9 (**) 2,1 2,2 3,2 1,7 2,3 
Hungary 0,7 (**) 0,7 0,6 1,2 0,7 0,8 
Iceland 2,5 (**) 2,6 2  2,1 2 
Ireland 3,3 (**) 3,5 1,5  2 3,7 
Italy       
Latvia 0,3 0,2 0 0,6 0,2 0,3 
Lithuania 0,3 0,3 0,3  0,3 0,3 
Luxembourg 3,2 (**) 4,6 3,4  4,6 3,3 
Malta 5,2 (sig) 5,2 5,7  4,9 6,6 
Republic of 
Moldava 0,1 0,1 0   0,1 
Montenegro 0,3 0,4 0,3  0,4 0,3 
Netherlands 3,3 (**/sig) 3,3 2,9 5,7 3,6 3,8 
Norway 3,3 (**/sig) 3,5 3,2 4,7 4,6 3,5 
Poland 0,1 (*) 0,1 0  0,3 0,2 
Portugal 0,3 0,3 0,2   0,4 
Romania 0,2 0,2 0,2  0,3 0,2 
Russian Federation 1,2 1,2 1,6 2,1 1,6 1,4 
Serbia 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,5 0,3 0,2 
Slovakia 1,1 (*) 1,2 1  0,9 0,8 
Slovenia 1,7 (**/sig) 1,8 1,1  1,6 2 
Spain 3,2 (**/sig) 3,6 2,7 0,4 3,9 4,1 
Sweden 4,5 (**/sig) 5,2 4,3 3,8 5,8 5 
Switzerland 3,6 (*/sig) 4,5 2,9  6,6 4,2 
Turkey 0 (**/sig) 0  0,3  0 
Ukraine 0,1 0,2  0,4 0,3 0,2 
Macedonia 1,2 (*) 1,2 1,4 2,7 1,3 1,2 
Great Britain 5,4 (**) 6,1 3,8 10,4 5,1 6,6 
Nothern Ireland 0,8 0,9 0  0,6 1,1 
Kosovo 0,2 0,2 0,1  0,5 0,1 
       * Sig. Bil. P. < 0.05; ** Sig. Bil. P. < 0.01; sig residu corregit -/+1,96 (la prova d‘hipòtesis fa 
referència al grau d’associació entre les tres variables racisme, tolerància LGB i nacionalisme) 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on EVS (2011). 
 
